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KEVIN KOPELSON 
Critical Virtuosity 
90 Here's a beautifully written, familiar opening. "For a long time I 
would go to bed early. Sometimes, the candle barely out, my eyes 
closed so quickly that I did not have time to tell myself: 'I'm falling 
asleep.'" (Proust 1:1) You know the rest. Here's another passage, 
by another novelist: 
Sloping down like an amphitheatre, submerged in the 
mist, [the city] spread out beyond the bridges, chaotical 
ly. And the featureless curve of open country sloped away 
up until it touched the far pale blur of the skyline. Seen 
like this from above, the whole landscape had the stillness 
of a painting; ships at anchor were crowded together in 
one corner, the river curved smoothly around the foot of 
the green hills, and the islands, oblong in form, looked 
just like big black fish, motionless on the water. (213) 
The city is Rouen. The traveler is, of course, Emma Bovary. And 
Roland Barthes, who may have idolized Flaubert as much as he 
idolized Proust, has something interesting?and to my mind, 
beautifully written?to say about it: 
In Madame Bovary, the description of Rouen (a real referent 
if ever there was one) is subject to the tyrannical con 
straints of what we must call aesthetic verisimilitude, as is 
attested by the corrections made in this passage in the 
course of six successive rewritings. Here we see, first of all, 
that the corrections do not in any way issue from a closer 
consideration of the model: Rouen, perceived by Flaubert, 
remains just the same, or more precisely, if it changes 
somewhat from one version to the next, it is solely because 
he finds it necessary to focus an image or avoid a phonic 
redundance condemned by the rules of le beau style, or again 
to 
"arrange" a quite contingent felicity of expression; next 
we see that the descriptive fabric, which at first glance 
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seems to grant a major importance (by its dimension, by 
the concern for its detail) to the object Rouen, is in fact only 
a sort of setting meant to receive the jewels of a number of 
rare metaphors, the neutral, prosaic excipient which 
swathes the precious symbolic substance, as if, in Rouen, 
all that mattered were the figures of rhetoric to which the 91 
sight of the city lends itself?as if Rouen were notable 
only by its substitutions (the masts like a forest of needles, the 
islands like huge motionless black fish, the clouds like aerial waves 
silently breaking against a cliff); last, we see that the whole 
description is constructed so as to connect Rouen to a paint 
ing: it is a painted scene which the language takes up 
("Thus, seen from above, the whole landscape had the 
motionless look of a painting"); the writer here fulfills 
Plato's definition of the artist as a maker in the third 
degree, since he imitates what is already the simulation of 
an essence. (144-45) 
David Trotter, in Cooking with Mud, has something interesting? 
and, to my mind, not beautifully written?to say about the 
Barthes: 
This description neither advances the narrative nor tells us 
all that much about Emma Bovary's state of mind. What it 
does do, by the proliferation of metaphor and simile it 
engenders, is draw our attention to the skill of the writer. 
We can, if we wish, suspend our eagerness to know what 
will happen to Emma, our rush ahead towards clarifying 
resolution, and savour the performance. It took Roland 
Barthes, a latterday fl?neur if ever there was one, to slip 
unobtrusively through the cordon of significant details, 
and illuminate the writer's pleasure, his narcissism. (205) 
Of course, that's what virtuosos supposedly do: draw attention to 
the skill of the performer. And that's what critical virtuosos (like 
Barthes) do: draw attention to the skill of the writer?a function 
of both pleasure and narcissism. And probably of fetishism as well. 
You may have already noticed that I'm not drawing such attention 
here, for reasons I'll describe. 
So much for men. Here's what Naomi Schor?in a chapter of 
Reading in Detail that takes as its epigraph her subject's call for both 
erotic and aesthetic criticism, but in a passage (like the Trotter) I 
find both unerotic and unaesthetic?has to say about the Barthes: 
92 Critics are not done with Barthes's scandalous assertion 
that there exist in realist texts "useless," totally parasitical 
details that contribute neither to advancing the plot, nor to 
enhancing our knowledge of the characters and their phys 
ical surroundings. One need only recall that a long critical 
tradition condemns the superfluous detail as symptomatic 
of decadence in order to appreciate the importance of the 
question raised by Barthes: what is at stake is nothing less 
than the legitimacy of the organic model of literary inter 
pretation, according to which all details?no matter how 
aberrant their initial appearance?can, indeed must be 
integrated into the whole, since the work of art is itself 
organically constituted. (85) 
The jury's still out as to whether, and when, virtuosity is gen 
dered: masculine mastery as opposed to feminine mystery. 
According to Edward Said, we associate it?in musical terms? 
with 
"dangerous effeminacy" (62). Not all virtuosos, however, are 
Said's Queen of the Night. Some are keyboard kings: Franz Liszt, 
Charles Rosen. 
I suspect that most critics don't try to write like Proust because 
they know they can't; or because, if they can write like him, they 
know they'll be discredited (by critics who can't) as mere stylists; 
or worse yet, as charlatans. For where virtuosity is concerned, it can 
be extremely hard?and sometimes impossible?to distinguish 
genius from charlatanry. Consider what Rosen?a critical virtuoso 
in more than one sense of the term (notice the felicity of expres 
sion, and then listen to his recordings); one, moreover, who sees 
the responsibilities of criticism the way I do (it should arise from 
an occasion rather than from an obsession, and from the direct 
experience of art rather than from an abstract scheme; it should 
enlarge the reader's sympathies, while sharpening her focus; it 
should aid and inform judgment; and, above all, it should give 
pleasure?to the reader, not the writer)?consider what he has to 
say about Liszt: 
[Liszt's] arrangement of Schubert's "Der Lindenbaum"... 
presents the theme in the right hand in octaves simulta 
neously above and below a steady, delicate trill, which 93 
gives a continuously vibrant sonority, while the left hand 
imitates a pizzicato bass and, at the same time, realizes 
Schubert's simple flowing accompaniment as if it were 
performed by a trio of French horns. This is, one must 
confess, rather an awful thing to do to a Schubert song, 
but it would be churlish to refuse one's admiration for the 
grandeur and richness of the conception?or for the 
pianist who can play it and make it sound as vulgarly 
beautiful as it was intended?particularly the spectacular 
passage where the trill is transferred to the fourth and 
fifth fingers and the accompanying triplets must be played 
with the thumb and the melody by the left hand. To com 
prehend Liszt's greatness one needs a suspension of dis 
taste, a momentary renunciation of musical scruples. 
This renunciation is not easy today, nor was it ever. Liszt 
was the great philistine musician. Right-thinking music 
lovers looked with horror on what they considered his char 
latanry. He was indeed a charlatan, and he knew it, and 
sometimes laughed at it. He was also a composer and 
pianist of the utmost refinement and originality. It is, 
unfortunately, useless to try to separate the great musician 
from the charlatan: each one needed the other in order to 
exist. (509-510) 
Now, I know I've just discredited myself, not by any stylishness, 
but by my use of the terms "genius" and "charlatan." To call some 
one a genius is basically a gesture of admiring incomprehension. 
To call someone a charlatan may amount to one of derogatory 
incomprehension. I do believe, however, in the validity of these 
terms. Permit me, like some judge called upon to define pornogra 
phy, to invoke an "I-know-it-when-I-see-it" test. Charles Rosen? 
Genius. Lee Edelman? Genius. Consider his analysis of another 
passage in Proust: 
At this moment it is Charlus who is said to undergo a 
transformation, but that claim displaces the transforma 
tion experienced by the narrator himself as he discovers, 
in the course of observing this scene, the two-fold imper 
ative of reading homographically?as he learns, in other 
94 words, not only that the appearance of similitude can con 
ceal a disorienting difference (of "meaning," as it were) 
internal to each of the sexed identities through which the 
symbolic articulates subjects, but also that a disciplined 
attention can recover the ideological coherence of identity 
precisely through the vigilance with which it seeks out 
and "reads" that category of person projectively con 
structed to embody, to signify by assuming as its charac 
terizing identity, this destabilizing rupture in identity 
itself. (19) 
D.A. Miller (another Proust idolator; another Barthes idolator?in 
addition to me, that is; and, in terms of gender, a fryper-masculine 
virtuoso)? Charlatan. Consider the opening of Place for Us: 
Long before its kind was manifestly endangered, the 
Broadway musical took on a protective coloration. Thanks 
to the curious discursive exemption that it may have been 
alone among the forms of our mass culture in enjoying, the 
musical was already prevented?or perhaps spared?from 
being an object of serious thought. Its formal description 
had always been left to the handiwork of technicians and 
aspiring show doctors, and its history was no more likely 
to cease being written in playbill-style reminiscences than 
its sociology was to leave the bush leagues of boosterism 
intent on pushing the American way. Yet, as if this gener 
al neglect were somehow not enough, at a certain 
moment?say, in 1943 with Oklahoma]?the Broadway 
musical came to seek misrecognition even in its own lime 
light, and all the heralded breakthroughs of its so-called 
golden age consisted in embracing with ever greater rigor 
the "dramatic model" of a show whose musical numbers, 
no longer introduced by pretexts as diaphanous as the 
hosiery on the female chorus line that was losing promi 
nence in the same sea-change, now had to be strictly 
rationalized by the dramatic situation, which they had in 
turn the all but moral duty to advance. The musical thus 
let itself be colonized, or camouflaged, by the same narra 
tive naturalism from whose tedium and tyranny its real 
merit was to keep alive, so long as it was vital itself, the 95 
prospect of a liberation. No doubt, we should all have been 
richer?less stupefied and better entertained?if the 
reverse procedure had been adopted, and instead of 
attempting to confer on Oklahoma! and its progeny the 
unremitting dramatic consistency of Clifford Odets or 
Arthur Miller, one had given to the work of the latter the 
formal structure of a Broadway musical, and so not only 
relieved us from its self-important earnestness but eluci 
dated its latent sentimentality as well. But even as matters 
stood, the stranglehold of the dramatic model only better 
rehearsed the sense of suffocation that had always under 
lain the breathless pleasure that the musical, despite its 
new public relations, hadn't ceased to afford, but that had 
now acquired, through them, the more intense character of 
a secret. (1-2) 
Since, at least with respect to Miller, you probably won't permit 
me to 
rely on that "I-know-it-when-I-see-it" test alone, allow me 
to demonstrate his charlatanry. Underneath a superficial felicity of 
expression we have some serious muscle flexing. The sentence 
structure, like Edelman's, is impressively Proustian, but needless 
ly so. The irony is impressively Socratic, but pointlessly so. (If it's 
a good thing for the Broadway musical to have been "spared" as an 
object of serious thought, what are we to make of the fact that 
Miller himself is treating it as one?) And whereas the criticism of 
the playwrights as stupefying and insufficiently entertaining is 
both impressively nasty and incapable of being redirected at 
Miller's own work, the criticism of their "self-important earnest 
ness" and "latent sentimentality" should be redirected that way. 
(I like my self-importance flippant, my sentimentality blatant.) 
Or, to take another example, consider the opening of Bringing 
Out Roland Barthes. (As if Barthes really needed Miller to bring him 
out: his idolization of Proust alone made his homosexuality abun 
dantly clear.) 
Twenty years ago in Paris, long before I, how you say, knew 
myself, a fellow student told me he had seen Roland 
96 Barthes late one evening at the Saint Germain Drugstore. 
Not the Americanized mini-mall where I would now and 
then swallow much disgust to go satisfy my palate (also 
Americanized, unfortunately for my ego syntony) with a 
hamburger or an ice cream? But on reflection: what better 
scene for Barthes to make than this curved, staggered 
dream space, where the density of merchandise, market 
ing, and anonymous masses of middle-class people must 
have presented so sharp a goad to his thinking about the 
status of the sign in a consumer society? Although in fre 
quenting the Drugstore by night (as soon after this intel 
ligence I began to do), I may initially have hoped to see 
Barthes, I eventually contented myself with doing Barthes, 
experiencing this promiscuous emporium as I imagined 
he might. Now the various displays of luxury would pro 
voke my hot imitation anger with their repulsive evidence 
of bourgeois myth in the process of naturalizing an oppres 
sive class bias; now they would lend themselves to my 
cool imitation appreciation as so many relaxed signifiers 
stiffening in no hierarchy but the continually flexible one 
instituted by desire, whose only trajectory in any case con 
formed to the defiles of a labyrinth. I'm not sure when, 
how, or even whether I understood that others liked to loi 
ter here of an evening quite as regularly as myself, but I 
gave up the habit?to do justice to the emphasis of my 
renunciation, one could say I kicked it?shortly after the 
moment when one such fl?neur, who could hardly have 
been in a hurry, considering how many times I had already 
passed him, whose determination to be friendly on the 
contrary seemed to me to suppose all the leisure in the 
world, stopped me?Monsieur!?and said, almost as 
though it weren't a question at all, avez-vous l'heure? (3-4) 
Here, Miller is (still) "doing" Barthes's prose style, not Proust's? 
and, I have to admit, doing it pretty well, and for a pretty good rea 
son. After all, one point of the book is Miller's eventual (gay) iden 
tification with Barthes. The problem is that his "imitation" anger 
and appreciation are doubly false. For not only were they derivative 
(assuming they're what Miller was really doing back then?I have 97 
my doubts), they aren't very Barthesian. The strategies learned by 
truly attentive readers of Mythologies (and Miller wants us to know 
that he's become one, or at least one now sufficiently attentive to its 
gay content) do not reduce to?are far more subtle than?finding 
either 
"repulsive evidence of bourgeois myth in the process of natu 
ralizing an oppressive class bias" or "so many relaxed signifiers 
stiffening in no hierarchy but the continually flexible one instituted 
by desire." Which Miller must know. What we have here, in other 
words, is not irony at Miller's own expense (showing that Miller 
used to be as ignorant about Barthesian criticism as about his own 
sexuality)?irony, moreover, that would support the book's point? 
but rather nastiness at Barthes's. What we have here is Miller 
"top 
ping" Barthes, implying that Mythologies isn't very subtle?and for 
no good reason other than that he likes to be on top, or that he likes 
to flex his muscles just to show them off. Call it deliberate, as 
opposed to merely derogatory, incomprehension. 
None of which is to say that I don't identify with Miller. In fact, 
I identify with him far more than I identify with Edelman. (By 
"identify," I mean to connote what Miller himself, with reference 
to Barthes, calls the "usual vicissitudes of adulation, aggression, 
ambivalence" [8].) And so I worry about my own sentence struc 
ture, my own Socratic irony, my own desire to entertain (as 
opposed to stupefy, or even to "please") the reader, my own need 
less desire to top people (including, needless to say, Miller). My 
own privileging of insignificant detail, my own "decadence." I also 
worry about my own narcissism. (I've often claimed that my nar 
cissism is merely performative, or that I enact it in order to 
encourage similarly situated readers to identify with me?but the 
claim, I must confess, is somewhat disingenuous.) In other words, 
I worry about my own charlatanry. Consider two p?d?rastie inci 
dents (one real, one imaginary) the Miller reminds me of. (We're 
back to the "I-know-it-when-I-see-it" test; figure out the charla 
tanry, if not the virtuosity, for yourselves.) The real one appears in 
my first book, Love's Litany: 
I was in Greenwich Village, waiting on line to see 
Visconti's Death in Venice, when a man d'un certain ?ge, a 
98 member, as it turned out, of nambla (the North 
American Man-Boy Love Association), an organization I 
had never heard of, handed me a flier extolling Thomas 
Mann's story as the greatest "affirmation" of man-boy 
love known to the western world. Having already read the 
story, and knowing both that Aschenbach dies and that 
Tadzio (to whom, not incidentally, I was then close in age) 
never loved him, I deemed this claim to be rather dubious. 
I did not yet know that it was also pitiful. And having 
found the nambla pamphleteer, like Aschenbach him 
self, to be decrepit in a sexually repulsive way, I decided 
that the whole idea of 
"man-boy love" was essentially dis 
gusting. (50) 
The imaginary incident opens the "Pianist Envy" section of 
Beethoven's Kiss, my second book. Here we have Barthes stalked, not 
by Miller, but by Gide (a writer I'm pretty sure he didn't idolize): 
Roland Barthes, a writer I can't but love, never met Andr? 
Gide, a writer I can. But imagine what might have hap 
pened if he had. September, 1932. Gide, out for a late after 
noon stroll, notices a young lyc?en reading Le Temps retrou 
v? and, emboldened by the concurrence of fine weather 
and good health, decides to cruise the boy. He takes an 
adjacent seat, sighs, pretends to notice the book's title, 
and mentions that he'd known the author personally. 
Barthes, who recognizes Gide but thinks better of saying 
so, asks whether, in light of that intimacy, he has reason 
to believe "Marcel" has been less than honest about his 
sexuality. Gide, impressed by the boldness and cunning of 
the question, as well as by the charm of the feigned igno 
rance (for it's clear the boy must know who he is), sug 
gests they continue this discussion at his home, over tea 
and cookies. Barthes accepts the invitation, of course?in 
large part because, oddly enough, he finds the old man 
somewhat attractive. (7) 
So?I've had to consider renouncing critical virtuosity. I've consid 
ered kicking the habit of creating passages impressive?or "spec 
tacular"? enough to invite critical dismissal, but also enough to 99 
withstand critical scrutiny. In other words, I've considered trying to 
write more like Trotter. (Unlike Edelman, he's no genius?but nei 
ther am I.) Not that I know what I'd produce that way. But I have 
wanted to know. After all, it might even be good. 
Of course, I'm not the only one to have renounced virtuosity. Liszt 
didn't devote his entire life to the piano, much to the dismay of his 
audience. He retired relatively young from the concert stage, never 
again to play in public?indeed, never again to practice (except for 
some double octaves here and there)?and devoted himself to his 
mistress, to giving master classes, to promoting other composers, to 
founding conservatories, to learning orchestration, to editing the 
Beethoven and Schubert sonatas, to conducting, to writing terrible 
books, to composing choral and orchestral as well as piano music, 
and to prayer. Nijinsky renounced his mastery of Romantic ballet in 
favor of 
"primitive" choreography. Racine, after writing Ph?dre, the 
last of the secular plays, renounced his mastery of the Alexandrine 
in order to become Louis xiv's historiographer. Heine gave up writ 
ing lyric poetry in order to write journalism. Lorca gave up poetry in 
order to direct a theater company. True, none of these performers 
worried about charlatanry. They renounced virtuosity for reasons 
unrelated to mine. Either their skill no longer posed a challenge; or 
it was too demanding?too difficult?a mistress, both physically 
and mentally; or they feared, or sensed, a kind of impotence; or they 
succumbed to shyness; or they succumbed to negative criticism? 
or even to the very notion of criticism; or they succumbed to reli 
gious scruples; or they simply succumbed to the concept of sim 
plicity. Their examples do, however, point toward something else 
I've had to consider?something you should consider: that you can 
never really renounce virtuosity, or that the question virtuosity 
invariably poses?"Just because you can, should you?"?also 
invariably demands the response, "Yes!" After all, Racine's last two 
plays?the religious dramas Esther and Athalie, first performed in a 
convent?are as virtuosic as Ph?dre (perhaps inadvertently so). 
Heine's journalism has a certain panache. (Perhaps inadvertently 
so.) Lorca's directorship was also the major period of his playwrit 
ing. Nijinsky's choreography is as difficult as ballet, in some ways 
more so. As for Liszt: not only did he continue to work out techni 
cal problems at the keyboard and not only did he continue to com 
100 pose virtuoso music for other pianists, he also treated the orchestra 
as a virtuoso instrument?much like Berlioz, who was better at it. 
You should also consider that there are at least three reasons? 
apart, that is, from the pleasure of either narcissism or fetishism? 
not to renounce critical virtuosity, so long as it isn't tantamount to 
charlatanry. There's the pleasure (for both reader and writer) of 
playing with language. There's the pleasure?how can I say this 
simply??of playing with form. Critical virtuosity, moreover, can 
have a substantive rigor of its own. In "Pianist Envy," for example, 
I rehearse an undoubtedly futile attempt to top both Gide and 
Barthes in order to enact, if not to demonstrate, my (our?) even 
tual gay disidentification with them. And so any bravura?or 
irony?there, although not exactly hyperfeminine, has nothing at 
all to do with Miller's muscle flexing. Or so I'd like to think. 
